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“Plain Crazy:” 
Lay Definitions of Legal Insanity 
Valerie P. Hans* and Dan Slater** 
The 1982 Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdict in the trial of 
John Hinckley, Jr., would-be assassin of President Reagan, again has brought 
to the forefront long-standing public dissatisfaction in the United States with 
the insanity plea. In the wake of the Hinckley verdict, proposals for reform 
or abolition of the insanity defense have been submitted to both houses of the 
U.S. Congress and to state legislatures throughout the nation (Cunningham, 
1983). Indeed, over the last several years, nine states have restricted or abolished 
altogether the defense of insanity (Rosenhan, 1983). Even organizations that 
support the concept of the insanity defense, such as the American Psychiatric 
Association and the American Bar Association, have recommended limitations 
in its scope or application (Cunningham, 1983; Insanity Defense Work Group, 
1983). Fueling this reform movement is apparent public dissatisfaction with 
the insanity plea as it is currently defined. 
In contrast to voluminous literature concerning legal and psychiatric per- 
spectives on the insanity plea, very little has been written on the public’s 
perception of the defense. This is the case in spite of the public’s apparent 
role as impetus for recent legal changes. It is important to consider the public’s 
views because such views may affect the legitimacy of the defense as well 
as verdicts in specific insanity cases. Public opinion surveys in the United 
States have revealed widespread beliefs that the insanity defense is a loophole 
(Bronson, 1970; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Hans & Slater, 1983). At least 
one study, however, has shown that the U.S. public has misconceptions about 
the criminally insane (Steadman & Cocozza, 1977). Negative attitudes also 
may be a result of pejorative labelling of the mentally ill in U.S. law (Sales 
& Kahle, 1980). Pasewark (198 1) has demonstrated that the public vastly 
overestimates the frequency with which defendants successfully employ the 
insanity plea. All these misconceptions may create negative views of the insanity 
defense. Furthermore, such perceptions could affect jury decision making. 
Jurors’ pre-existing views of the insanity defense may interact with legal in- 
structions when juries decide cases (Simon, 1967). 
As part of a larger study on reactions to the Hinckley trial (Hans & Slater, 
1983), we asked a random sample of Delaware residents what they thought 
was the test of legal insanity. Only 1 of our 434 respondents gave a reasonably 
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good approximation of the Model Penal Code definition of legal insanity which 
was used in the Hinckley trial and was employed in Delaware at the time of 
that trial. There are three elements in the Model Penal Code test. Defendants 
are entitled to be found NGRI (1) as a result of mental disease or defect, (2) 
if they lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct, 
or (3) are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. 
The obvious divergence of lay views of legal insanity from the actual legal 
definition in our sample directed us to explore the substance of lay perceptions. 
The purpose of the present paper is to report in detail the full range of our 
sample’s definitions 




who were contacted 
of legal insanity and to examine demographic correlates 
434 men and women from New Castle County, Delaware’ 
by telephone using random digit dialing techniques. The 
demographic characteristics of the sample generally paralleled 1980 census 
data for the county, although women, people in the 25-34 age range, and 
more highly educated individuals were overrepresented in the sample as com- 
pared to the census. The racial composition of the community (86% white, 
14% nonwhite) was reflected accurately in our sample. 
Procedure 
Nine trained and paid interviewers conducted the survey beginning one 
week following the announcement of the verdict, on four consecutive evenings 
from June 28-July 1, 1982. The interviewers introduced themselves to persons 
answering the telephone and asked for their reactions to the Hinckley verdict. 
Calculation of the refusal rate was complicated by the fact that some interviewers 
recorded nonresidental and other inappropriate numbers with the same notation 
used for refusals. However, the remainder of the interviewers had a refusal 
rate of about 5%. 
The questionnaire contained items related to the Hinckley trial, the insanity 
defense, and forensic psychiatry. The demographic characteristics of age, 
gender, race, and education, and media use information were solicited from 
respondents. 
To tap their understanding of the legal test for insanity, respondents were 
asked, “In a few words, what do you think is the legal definition of insanity?” 
The response format for this question was open-ended, and interviewers were 
instructed to take down respondents’ answers verbatim, or as close to verbatim 
’ New Castle County encompasses the northern third of the state of Delaware and includes the urban 
center of Wilmington, the university community of Newark, and both suburban and rural/farming areas. 
New Castle County is the home of major corporations (e.g., DuPont, Hercules) as well as large automotive 
plants (Chrysler, General Motors). Census studies of voter registration, persons voting, and households 
with telephone service show that residents are within 3% of national averages. Delaware residents, on 
the whole, have a higher per capita income than the national average (Bureau of the Census, 1980). 
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as possible. A coding system with 14 different categories was developed from 
a subset of the responses. Two raters coded the sample’s responses individually 
and initially agreed on 86% of the answers. The responses which generated 
disagreement were discussed and in all instances a code was agreed upon by 
the two raters. In the small number (N = 22) of instances in which respondents 
provided multiple answers, raters selected the first coherent or complete state- 
ment for coding. 
Results 
Dejinition Categories 
Table 1 displays the categories of definitions of legal insanity given by 
respondents. 
Examples of responses coded in each of the categories also are provided. 
By far the most frequent category was Don’t know what you’re doing. Almost 
a quarter of the entire sample (23.0%) defined legal insanity in this way. A 
review of the examples in this category will reveal that some respondents 
insisted on almost total lack of awareness, e.g., “someone who loses all sense 
of reality” and “someone who loses their mind, can’t think at all.” Three 
categories--Mental disease, Cannot tell right from wrong, and Having no 
control-coincide with the three elements of the Model Penal Code test. A 
small number of our respondents (3.9%) equated legal insanity with mental 
disease or mental problems. About one out of every eight ( 12.3%) respondents 
defined legal insanity as being unable to differentiate right from wrong. Answers 
in this category emphasized the cognitive-moral dimension, and, as the examples 
show, most explicitly used the terms right and wrong. A similar number of 
respondents (12.8%) instead focused on the volitional component, defining 
legal insanity as Having no control over one’s actions. 
Two other categories, each claiming about 5% of the sample, deserve men- 
tion. Some respondents used Colloquial expressions, such as “nuts altogether” 
or “go off the top” to define legal insanity. Others defined as legally insane 
those Nor responsible for themselves or their actions. 
The remaining categories accounted for insignificant numbers of respondents. 
Accordingly, they were combined, along with unclassifiable responses, into 
an umbrella Other category (18.8%). Finally, about one out of every five 
respondents ( 18.6%) responded Don’t know to the interviewer’s request to 
define legal insanity. 
Demographic Correlates Of insanity DeJnitions 
We had information about the age, race, gender, and education of the re- 
spondents. Chi square analyses revealed that there were significant associations 
between three of these demographic variables-education, gender and race- 
and definitions of legal insanity. 
Not surprisingly, the relationship between legal definitions and education 
was strong and statistically significant [x2 (21, N = 414) = 59.83, p < .OOl]. 
Those with more formal education were more likely to define legal insanity 
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TABLE 1 
Definitions of Legal Insanity 
Don’t Know What You’re Doing (23% of respondents) 
didn’t know what he was doing 
not aware of actions 
can’t comprehend or think rationally 
someone who loses all sense of reality, doesn’t know 
who he or she is 
someone who loses their mind, can’t think at all 
doing something you don’t know what you are doing 
Having No Control (12.8% of respondents) 
out of control 
no control at all, no smarts, can’t talk 
doing something uncontrollably 
mental and physical lack of control over behavior 
doesn’t have control of emotions and thought processes 
unable to control your mind and body 
not being able to command faculties 
people have no control over feelings 
Cannot Tell Right From Wrong (12.3% of respondents) 
doesn’t realize what he is doing is wrong 
don’t know right from wrong 
moral self loses it 
Colloquial Expressions (6% of respondents) 
crazed 
a real nut 
go off the top 
doesn’t have all his marbles 




Not Responsible (4.6% of respondents) 
not responsible for actions 
not responsible for self 
nor able to rake responsibility for their actions 
Mental Disc (3.9% of respondents) 
something wrong with the mind 
mentally incomperenr 
mental illness 
mind’s messed up 
sick in the head 
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9 (18.8% of respondents) 
cannot cope in society with society’s rules 
anyone who commits such a crime is insane 
dangerous to others 
no such thing as insanity 
a gimmick to get away with your actions 
history of erratic behavior 
Don’t Know (18.8% of respondents) 
as Cannot tell rightfrom wrong and Not responsible. In contrast, respondents 
with less formal education were more apt to use Colloquiul expressions, respond 
with Don’t know, or define legal insanity as Don’t know what you’re doing. 
For example, just one respondent (1.9%) who had less than a high school 
education defined legal insanity as Cannot tell right from wrong, compared 
to 23 (21.5%) college graduates. Similarly, 9 (17%) respondents without a 
high school education used Colloquial expressions, compared to 1 (0.9%) 
college graduate. 
Men and women defined legal insanity somewhat differently [x2 (7, N = 
410) = 19.34, p < .007]. Women were almost twice as likely to describe legal 
insanity as Don’t know what you’re doing (29.2% of females versus 16.2% 
of males), whereas men’s responses were twice as likely to fall into the umbrella 
Other category (25.7% of males versus 12.8% of females). In all other cat- 
egories, men’s and women’s responses were within a few percentage points 
of each other. 
Men in our sample reported more years of formal education (M = 14.12 
years) than women (M = 13.07) [t (424) = 3.90, p < .OOl]. We attempted 
to provide a control for these educational differences between men and women 
by examining the relationship between definitions and gender within four broad 
educational levels (less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some 
college, and college graduate). At all four levels women were more likely to 
respond Don’t know what you’re doing and men more likely to offer responses 
that could only be classified as Other, but this differential responding was 
statistically significant only at the highest level of education [x2 (7, N = 107) 
= 17.47, p < .02]. The impact of education on definitions was significant 
in both male and female subsamples [x2 (21, N = 166) = 37.72, p < .Ol 
for males; x2 (21, N = 243) = 44.44, p < .002 for females]. 
Race also was significantly related to definitions of legal insanity [x2 (7, 
N = 397) = 32.42, p < .OOlJ. White respondents were much more likely 
to describe legal insanity as Cannot tell right from wrong (14.5% of whites 
versus 1.7% of nonwhites), while nonwhites were more likely to use Colloquial 
expressions (18.6% of nonwhites versus 3.8% of whites) or respond Don’t 
know (27% of nonwhites compared to 16.9% of whites). Differences in formal 
education between whites and nonwhites in our sample did not reach statistical 
significance [t (412) = 1.33, p < .18]. Because chi square analyses of the 
relationship among race, education, and definitions produced unacceptably 
small cell sizes, it was impossible to determine whether whites and nonwhites 
held divergent perceptions of legal insanity at different educational levels. 
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Television Viewing 
Respondents’ use of television was related to their definitions of legal insanity 
[x2 (14, N = 415) = 30.97, p < .006]. Respondents were divided into light, 
medium, and heavy users on the basis of their reports of how much television 
they watched per day. Light viewers were defined as watching less than two 
hours per day, medium viewers as two to four hours per day, and heavy 
viewers as more than four hours per day. Light viewers were more likely to 
define legal insanity as Cannot tell rightfrom wrong (18.6% of light viewers 
compared to 12.6% of medium viewers and 5.6% of heavy viewers). Heavy 
viewers on the other hand were more likely to use Colloquial expressions 
(1 .O% of light viewers versus 4.9% of medium viewers and 14.4% of heavy 
viewers). It was not possible to determine the extent to which education or 
race mediated this effect because of unacceptably small cell sizes. However, 
education and race were significantly associated with level of television viewing. 
Those with less formal education [x2 (6, N = 431) = 28.71, p < .OOl] and 
nonwhites [x2 (2, N = 416) = 16.17, p < .OOl] were most likely to be heavy 
viewers. These findings are consistent with other research (Comstock, Chaffee, 
Katzman, McCombs, & Roberts, 1978). The other media use variables- 
television news viewing and newspaper reading-were not significantly related 
to legal definitions. 
Insanity Defense as a Loophole 
People’s beliefs about what constitutes legal insanity may be related to the 
apparently common view that the insanity defense is a loophole. To explore 
this possibility, we cross-tabulated respondents’ definitions of legal insanity 
with their endorsement of the statement, “The insanity defense is a loophole 
that allows too many guilty people to go free.” Responses were coded on a 
Likert-type scale. Fully two-thirds of the sample “strongly agreed” with this 
statement. To ensure adequate cell sizes for the chi square analysis, all other 
response categories were collapsed into one category representing less agree- 
ment. Respondents who strongly agreed that the insanity defense was a loophole 
did hold somewhat different views about legal insanity from those respondents 
stating less agreement [x2 (7, N = 409) = 17.68, p < .Ol]. Those who 
‘“strongly agreed” (SA) were more likely than those expressing “less agree- 
ment” (LA) to define insanity as Don’t know what you’re doing (27.6% for 
SA versus 14.9% for LA). In contrast, those who expressed less agreement 
were more likely to define legal insanity as Not responsible (2.5% of SA 
versus 9.0% of LA) or Don’t know (17.1% of SA but 22.4% of LA). 
Discussion 
This survey occurred in the week following the Hinckley verdict. Arguably, 
more Americans were exposed to information and debate about the insanity 
defense during that time than any other period in recent memory. Despite this 
context of relatively high information, the bulk of our respondents were unable 
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to define the legal test for insanity. Their responses were nevertheless fas- 
cinating . 
The most frequent way people defined the legal test was Don’t know what 
you’re doing. This may represent on an intuitive level people’s views of what 
is, or in any event should be, the condition under which an individual may 
be excused from responsibility for criminal conduct. Researchers familiar 
with the history of the insanity plea may note the similarity between this type 
of response and the so-called “wild beast” test employed in some early trials. 
For instance in 1724 in the trial of Edward Arnold, also known as Crazy Ned, 
the presiding judge charged the jury: “It must be a man that is totally deprived 
of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no 
more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast” (Quen, 1983, p. 158). 
In addition, one of the components of the McNaughtan Rule employed in 
England (Moran, 1981), and approximately 20 states in the USA, is not ap- 
preciating the nature and quality of one’s acts, i.e., not knowing what one is 
doing. The Model Penal Code definition, used in the Hinckley trial and in 
Delaware at the time of the study, however, does not explicitly contain such 
a provision. Rather, it focuses more specifically on understanding the wrong- 
fulness of one’s acts. 
The apparently common belief that the legal definition for insanity is a lack 
of understanding of what one is doing may help to explain why so many of 
our respondents believed the insanity defense was a loophole. These respondents 
had just witnessed Hinckley, who even by his own account “knew” what he 
was doing (Hinckley, 1982), adjudged NGRI by a jury. This apparent dis- 
crepancy may have led them to the view that the insanity defense was indeed 
a loophole that allowed the guilty to go free. In fact, respondents who defined 
legal insanity as Don’t know what you’re doing were more likely than other 
respondents to agree that the insanity defense was a loophole. 
This raises the possibility that the public, and even jurors, may employ 
their own understanding of legal insanity rather than legal rules in making 
judgments .about criminal responsibility. Even if defendants are legally insane 
under the relevant test, unless they “don’t know what they’re doing” some 
members of the public may hold them criminally responsible. This prospect 
is even more alarming since in defining legal insanity some of our respondents 
insisted on near total lack of comprehension. Very few, if any, defendants 
would be able to meet such a strict standard. 
In our study, the demographic variables of education, gender, and race, 
and television viewing were all related to the way people defined legal insanity. 
Furthermore, several of these variables showed strong intercorrelations. While 
any attempt to establish causality could only be speculative at this point, the 
results do suggest that different groups in our society have varied notions of 
what constitutes legal insanity. Amount of formal education had a marked 
effect on respondents’ answers, and it is likely that educational differences 
among subgroups contributed to the other demographic effects. However, the 
possibility exists that even if they could be equated for educational level, 
certain subgroups such as men and women or whites and nonwhites might 
hold different views about what constitutes legal insanity. Indeed, the definition 
Cannot tell right from wrong was given most often by white males. Carol 
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Gilligan (1982) has recently documented differences between men and women 
in their concept of morality and what constitutes moral behavior. She has 
argued that men appear to be more rule bound in their definition of moral 
behavior, while women seem to take the context of the behavior into account 
in determining what is moral. Such differences might well affect men’s and 
women’s attributions of the conditions under which defendants could be ab- 
solved from moral responsibility for their conduct. Future research could in- 
vestigate the links between knowledge and views of legal insanity and moral 
reasoning. 
In our study, light and heavy television users reported different definitions 
of legal insanity. Gerbner and Gross (1976) have reported that light and heavy 
viewers have divergent perceptions of crime in society no matter what content 
is viewed. Others suggest that the content of what is viewed may also be a 
factor. Haney and Manzolati (1981) have demonstrated that criminal motivation 
and the link between mental illness and crime are distorted on many popular 
television programs. If such distortions are seen as real (Slater & Elliott, 
1982), they may affect views of the insanity defense and help shape people’s 
definitions. 
As a telephone survey of the residents of one geographical area in the USA, 
this study has some obvious limitations. Respondents gave, in an open-ended 
format, only brief definitions of what they thought constituted legal insanity. 
There were no follow-up questions, a feature of some other surveys. One 
drawback of an open-ended format is that the verbal ability of respondents 
may determine their answers. People with similar knowledge of the test for 
legal insanity may express themselves quite differently depending on their 
verbal fluency, which of course is affected by formal education. For example, 
a person with less education might respond Don’t know what you’re doing 
when what he/she really means is Cannot tell rightfrom wrong, a phrase that 
perhaps comes more readily to a more highly educated individual. We ac- 
knowledge the contributory role of verbal fluency but believe that the educational 
differences found in the present study reflect actual differences in the way 
respondents think about legal insanity. Support for this position comes from 
the fact that respondents who said that the definition of legal insanity was 
Don’t know what you’re doing were more likely to endorse the statement that 
the insanity defense was a loophole than were respondents who defined legal 
insanity as Cannot tell rightfrom wrong. Fully 79.2% of the Don’t know what 
you’re doing respondents strongly agreed that the insanity defense was a loop- 
hole, compared to 65.4% of the Cannot tell right from wrong respondents. 
Furthermore, 13.4% of the Cannot tell right from wrong respondents disagreed 
that the insanity defense was a loophole, compared to just 3.1% of the Don’t 
know what you’re doing resp.ondents. Nevertheless, in future studies, beliefs 
about legal insanity should be assessed with other response formats in an 
effort to minimize effects due to differences in verbal fluency. 
While these limitations should be noted, our study provides unique data 
about how the public views the insanity defense. More work on the formation 
of the public’s views and the relationship between these views and individual 
attitudes toward crime, justice, and mental illness may yield important results 
for our future understanding of the concept of legal insanity and its application 
in real-life cases. 
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The results of the study raise a broader issue as well. What should be the 
relationship between lay views of legal insanity and legal definitions? Di- 
vergence between the two may create difficulties. This is illustrated by the 
following excerpt from the testimony of Nathalia Brown, one of the jurors 
in the Hinckley case, before a U.S. Senate subcommittee on criminal law: 
Well, insane is a word that-it is hard to figure out. OK, you 
have got your legal insanity. Then you have got your lay insanity. 
We can say insane and think of somebody being crazy. But the legal 
insanity, how far does that go? We really do not know as lay witnesses 
(United States Congress, 1982, p. 161). 
In addition to causing confusion for jurors, disparity between lay and legal 
notions of insanity may lessen respect for the legal system. 
There are two perspectives on how society might address this divergence 
between lay and legal definitions of insanity. On the one hand, some might 
argue that legal rules of insanity are simply formalizations of cultural sentiments 
about what behavior is morally excusable because of mental illness. There is 
no magic in the legal terminology, no scientific study of such phrases as 
“ability to appreciate the nature and consequences of one’s acts,” and no 
operationalizations of the concepts incorporated into insanity laws. In this 
view, if lay and legal notions diverge then the law should be changed so that 
it more closely reflects lay views of insanity. Likewise, jurors should be free 
to draw upon their own lay views of insanity in arriving at verdicts. Certainly 
there is evidence that on other issues shifts in public opinion lead to legal 
change (Page & Shapiro, 1983). New limitations in U.S. insanity defense 
laws after negative public response to the Hinckley verdict appear to be part 
of this general pattern. 
On the other hand, what is clear from both this study and from other work 
is that the public is badly informed about the insanity defense. We believe 
that widespread misconceptions have caused the public to be overly concerned 
about the application, use, and success of the insanity plea (Hans & Slater, 
1983; Pasewark, 1981). In our view it would be precipitous to alter centuries- 
old legal rules for insanity in response to opinions of a discontented but poorly 
informed public. Furthermore, others have suggested that the insanity defense 
should be maintained as it currently exists whether or not it comports with 
current lay views of legal insanity (Slovenko, 1982; Stone, 1982). In their 
view, the insanity plea reflects critical legal-philosophical foundations of a 
democratic society. For example, Alan Stone, a past president of the American 
Psychiatric Association, argues that the insanity defense serves larger interests. 
As he states, “It is not psychiatrists, it is not criminals, it is not the insane 
who need the insanity defense. The insanity defense is the exception that 
‘proves’ the rule of free will. It is required by the law itself . . .” (Stone, 
1982, p. 2 1). He maintains that the fact some defendants can be found Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity demonstrates that other criminals had free will 
and thus can be convicted and punished. 
Because the proper relationship between public views and law regarding 
insanity is partly a value judgment, it cannot be resolved exclusively by em- 
pirical means. The tension that exists between lay views and legal definitions 
will continue until laws are reformed to be consistent with lay views or until 
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the public becomes adequately informed or persuaded of the necessity for the 
insanity defense. To assist that process, further research and continued public 
debate are required. 
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